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Abstract 
In December 2008 and March-April 2009 the Australian Government used fiscal stimulus as 
a short-run economic stabilization tool for the first time since the 1990s. In May-June 2012, 
households received lump sum cheques as compensation for the introduction of the Carbon 
Tax scheduled for 1 July 2012. This paper examines the relationship between these financial 
windfalls and spending at electronic gaming machines (EGMs) using data from 62 local 
government areas in Victoria, Australia. The results show large increases in spending at 
EGMs during the periods when Australian households received economic stimulus cheques. 
Increased spending at EGMs in December 2008 amounted to 1% of the total stimulus for that 
period. We conclude that the 2008-2009 stimulus packages substantially increased gambling 
at EGMs in Victoria. We find no unexpected increase in spending at EGMs in the months 
when Carbon Tax compensation cheques were paid. 
 
JEL classification: E21, E62, H3, H5, L83 
Keywords: Gambling, stimulus, Australia, windfall income, electronic gaming 
 
I. Introduction
As part of the response to the 2008 Great Recession (in Australia better known as the Global Financial Crisis
or GFC) the Australian Government pump-primed the economy with two rounds of lump-sum, non-taxable
stimulus cheques. The first round of stimulus cheques was announced on 14 October 2008 under the banner of
the ‘Economic Security Strategy’ (ESS) and delivered approximately $8.8 billion to Australian households. The
second round of stimulus cheques was announced on 3 February 2009 under the banner of the ‘Nation Building
and Jobs Plan’ (NBP) and delivered an additional $12.2 billion to Australian households.1
By any standard these were very substantial transfers. The combined total of ESS and NBP payments amounted
to nearly $1,000 for every person living in Australia. According to official estimates around 10.6 million families
and singles received a payment under either the ESS or NBP (Swan, 2009). 2 By the end of the two rounds of
stimulus cheques many families received several thousand dollars.
Conventional economic theory holds that expansionary fiscal policy facilitates short-run increases in consumption,
thereby stimulating aggregate demand. From this perspective, any increase in consumption immediately follow-
ing the stimulus cheques should have been anticipated. This is especially the case for normal goods and services
with high elasticity of demand such as gambling (Suits, 1979). Yet it was only when the lump-sum compensation
for the introduction of Australia’s Carbon Tax3 was paid to low-income households (the so-called Clean Energy
Supplements) that reports appeared in the press that such cheques would, or did, lead to an increase in money
spent at ‘the pokies’4 (Australian Financial Review, 2012).
We have formally tested these claims. We first modelled real monthly net expenditure5 per EGM in 62 local gov-
ernment areas (LGAs) across the state of Victoria for the period July 2004 to June 2012. The model specification
used linear regressions controlling for seasonality, a linear time trend and LGA specific effects. We obtained an
1The actual NBP was much larger than just the stimulus cheques to households. It included, among other things, free roof insulation for
households, the building of new multi-purpose school halls and libraries (the Building Education Revolution), some 20,000 new social and
defence homes, and increased funding for local roads and community infrastructure.
2This constitutes 96% of families and singles, based on the statement in the same media release that 8.8 million constituted just under
80% of families and singles.
3Although it is a carbon pricing mechanism with a fixed price period until 1 July 2015 when the system becomes an emission trading
scheme, we will refer to it by its more popular name.
4Pokies, or poker machines, is the term used in Australia for EGMs which are also commonly known as one-armed bandits, fruit machines,
slot machines, or simply ‘slots’.
5Net expenditure is the official term used in the industry for the total amount lost by players. From the perspective of the gaming venue
this is revenue. From the perspective of the individual this is an expense.
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estimate of the monthly anomaly in expenditure per EGM for each of the 96 months in the 2004-2012 financial
years. This allowed us to compare the timing of the stimulus cheques with the Carbon Tax compensation cheques
to anomalies in net expenditure per EGM. We found that the largest monthly anomalies in net expenditure per
EGM coincided with the 2008-2009 stimulus cheques. We found no unexpected increases in net expenditure per
EGM in the months when Carbon Tax compensation cheques were paid.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In Section II we provide some background on the details of
the ESS and NBP that applied to households, as well as an overview of gambling in Australia within a broader
international context. A discussion of the data used and our estimation strategy is presented in Section III. The
results are presented in Section IV and we end with concluding remarks and directions for future research in
Section V.
II. Background
II.I. Details on the economic stimulus cheques to households
Australian households received two rounds of stimulus cheques in the 2008-09 financial year. Payments to
pensioners and families in the first round (ESS) totalling $8.8 billion were announced on 14 October 2008 and
made available from 8 December 2008. Under the ESS, a total of $4.8bn was paid to Australia’s four million
pensioners. Pensioners include senior Australians on the Age Pension as well as recipients of a Disability Support
Pension.6 Single pensioners received a lump-sum non-taxable cheque of $1,400 and couples received a combined
$2,100. Individuals who were receiving Carer Allowance also received an additional $1,000 for each eligible
person in their care. A further $3.9bn was made available to about 2 million families (covering 3.9 million
children) who received Family Tax Benefit Part-A or who had dependants eligible for Youth Allowance, Abstudy
or Veterans’ Children’s Education Scheme payments. Families received $1,000 for each eligible dependant in
their care.
Although there may have been political reasons to make the first round of stimulus cheques available to pension-
ers and families with dependants, a more practical reason might have been that the only means available to the
Government to dispense money quickly was to use its social security clearing house, Centrelink. Alternatively,
6Those eligible for payments were: Age Pensioners; Disability Support Pensioners; Carer Payment recipients; Wife and Widow B Pensioners;
Partner, Widow and Bereavement Allowees; Veterans’ Affairs Service Pensioners; Veterans’ Income Support Supplement recipients; Veterans
Affairs Gold Card holders eligible for Seniors Concession Allowance; Those of age pension age who receive Parenting Payment, Special
Benefit, or Austudy; and Self Funded Retirees holding a Commonwealth Senior Health Card.
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pensioners and families in receipt of Family Tax Benefits may have been perceived as having a high marginal
propensity to consume which would make the stimulus more effective.
The second round of stimulus cheques was initially announced on 3 February 2009, but revised on 13 February
2009 due to opposition by the Liberal-National coalition (Leigh, 2012). The second round of stimulus cheques
included $12.2 billion in payments. The payment most Australians seem to remember is the Tax Bonus Payment
which paid $900 if a 2007-08 income tax return was lodged by 30 June 2009. In addition, families eligible for
Family Tax Benefit Part-B on 3 February 2009 received the Single Income Family Bonus of $900. Any family in
receipt of Family Tax Benefit Part-A on 3 February 2009 who had school aged children (aged 4 to 18 years) also
received the Back to School Bonus of $950 per eligible child. Students eligible for social security payments also
received this $950 in the name of the Training and Learning Bonus. All these stimulus cheques were cumulative.
Table 1 summarizes the stimulus payments:
TABLE 1: Summary of 2008-2009 stimulus packages
Date Amount Eligibility
Economic Security Strategy
Pensioner payments December 2008 $1400 for singles, Pensioners, carers and seniors
$2100 for couples
Carer payments December 2008 $1000 per person cared for Carers
Child payments December 2008 $1000 per child Family Tax Benefit-A recipients
Nation Building and Jobs Plan
Tax Bonus for Working Australians April - May 2009 up to $900 per individual Tax payers below $100K
Back to School Bonus March 2009 $950 per child (aged 4-18) Family Tax Benefit-A recipients
Single-Income Family Bonus March 2009 $900 per family Family Tax Benefit-B recipients
Notes: The Tax Bonus for Working Australians paid $900 to taxpayers with taxable income up to and including $80,000. The payment was
reduced to $600 for individuals with taxable incomes between $80,000 and $90,000 and $250 for taxable incomes between $90,000 and
$100,000 (above which the payment was reduced to zero).
There were no caps on the amount of stimulus money a family could receive, so depending on the make up of the
household it was possible to received very large sums. For example, Leigh (2012) discussed a hypothetical family
with a household income of $80,000 and two school-aged children that would have received about 4 percent
of their annual household income from the 2009 stimulus cheques. This estimate increases to approximately 7
percent of annual household income if the December 2008 cheques are accounted for.
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II.II. Details on the lump-sum compensation for the introduction of the Carbon Tax
Compensation paid to Australian households for the introduction of the Carbon Tax took the form of changes to
the (income) tax system and increases in transfers paid to families in the form of increased family benefits and
pensions (labelled Clean Energy Supplements). Changes to the tax system had the effect of spreading these bene-
fits over an entire (fiscal) year for most tax payers. From 1 July 2013 the increase in family payments, pensions
and allowances, too, will be spread over the year as they will be rolled into the fortnightly benefits payments.
Only for the first year of the Carbon Tax did compensation for families with dependants and pensioners take the
form of upfront lump-sum cheques. These were sent out in May and June 2012, before the Carbon Tax took effect.
Individuals in receipt of a pension or allowance, or self-funded retirees holding a Commonwealth Seniors Health
Card, received a cheque that amounted to 1.7% of the maximum annual pension or allowance. For example, a
person in receipt of the Age Pension or Disability Support Pension would have received a $250 cheque if they
were single or $190 each if they were part of a couple ($380 combined). Those in receipt of an allowance
payment received $160 if single without dependants and $300 as a couple without dependents.7
In addition to the clean energy supplement of 1.7% of the maximum pension/allowance, families with dependent
children in receipt of Family Tax Benefits (FTB) also received a 1.7% increase in the maximum rate of FTB Part-A.
This amounted to a payment of $109.50. Further, families reliant on a single income received compensation of up
to $300 in the form of a new Single Income Family Supplement. The total effect of the Carbon Tax compensation
was approximately $325 million paid to more than 1.6 million families. In Victoria, 415,400 families shared $79
million (Harrison, 2012).
II.III. Gambling in Australia and abroad
Australia is often referred to as ‘the lucky country’8 and one is inclined to think Australians take that literally given
their love of gambling. When measured as net expenditure per adult, Australia has the highest gambling rate in
the world (The Economist, 2012a). Despite having a population of just close to 23 million, net expenditures on
gambling in Australia account for more than 5% of the world’s total (see Table 2).
7These rates were taken from the press release ’Clean Energy Advance Rates - March 2012’ that lists some 80+ cases of different levels of
clean energy supplements for the myriad of different social security payments. See FaHCSIA.
8Donald Horne wrote a book in the 1960s with this title. Although the title was sarcastic (Horne called Australia “a lucky country, run by
second rate people who share its luck”) it is often used as a term of endearment.
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TABLE 2: Leading ten gambling nations by gross win 2012
Rank Country Gross Win 2012 (C bn) % of Global Total
1 United States 80.45 25.10
2 China (incl. Hong Kong & Macau) 49.91 15.60
3 Japan 31.09 9.70
4 Italy 19.05 5.90
5 Australia 16.98 5.30
6 United Kingdom 15.07 4.70
7 Canada 12.34 3.80
8 Germany 10.7 3.30
9 France 10.36 3.20
10 Spain 9.46 2.90
Total 320.95 100.00
Notes: Proprietary data from H2 Gambling Capital. Available from: h2gc.com ‘Gross win’ is the total amount
the casinos won (and the patrons lost) in 2012
But what distinguishes Australia is the pervasiveness of EGMs and their share of total net expenditure on
gambling. EGMs are the main method of gaming in Australia. In 2008-09 Australians lost about $10.4bn on
EGMs, or 55% of the total net expenditure on gambling (see Table 3 in the appendix). This was about the same
as the net expenditure on EGMs in the state of Nevada (including Las Vegas) and New Jersey’s Atlantic City
combined.9
II.IV. The electronic gaming machine (EGM) data
Data on net expenditure at EGMs have been gathered from various publications made publicly available by the
Victorian Commission for Gambling and Liquor Regulation (VCGLR). Most official data in Australia are collected
under codes of compliance, but rarely are government data accessible to the public.10 The VCGLR is a notable
and laudable exception. The dataset we constructed has monthly net expenditure on EGMs for 62 Victorian
LGAs from July 2004 to June 2012 (inclusive), or 96 monthly observations in 62 LGAs for a combined 5952
observations. Victoria has 79 LGAs, but not all LGAs have EGMs and some LGAs have all their EGM licenses in
one or two venues. Publishing net expenditure on EGMs in these cases may reveal sensitive business information
as it could potentially be linked to particular venues. To avoid this the VCGLR combines some LGAs for reporting
purposes.
9Data from the publications ‘Nevada Gaming Revenues, 1984-2011’ and ‘Atlantic City Gaming Revenue’ as published by the University of
Nevada Las Vegas Centre for Gaming Research.
10For an overview of accessible gaming data see Farrell (2012).
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Data also exist for the period prior to 2004, but not only had the market for EGMs stabilised by 2004 (having
expanded rapidly after its introduction in 1992), the make up of LGAs for reporting purposes no longer changed
after 2004. We merged the number of EGMs in the LGA as well as CPI data from the ABS to construct real
monthly net expenditure per EGM from July 2004 to June 2012. This is the dependent variable of interest in our
model. Figure 1 shows average monthly net expenditure per EGM for each LGA in Victoria over the period July
2004 to June 2012.
FIGURE 1: Average real monthly net expenditures per EGM (July 2004 to June 2012)
Notes: The Victorian Commission for Gambling and Liquor Regulation (VCGLR) combines figures from several LGAs and applies the
results to each. Hence Pyrenees is equal to Ararat; Loddon, Mount Alexander and Hepburn are equal to Central Goldfields; Moyne,
Southern Grampians and Queenscliffe are equal to Corangamite; Towong is equal to Mansfield; Moira, Strathbogie and Gannawarra
are equal to Murrindindi. Six LGAs without data are coloured white (Indigo, Buloke, Golden Plains, Hindmarsh, West Wimmera and
Yarriambiack) as is French Island.
The market for EGMs is highly regulated. In addition to a state-wide cap, there are also regional caps on the
number of machines. In case no regional cap applies, municipal caps apply. In a market with a state-wide cap but
no regional or municipal caps one would expect expenditure per EGM to be similar across LGAs. If not, then
moving machines from a low yielding LGA to a high yielding LGA would increase profits.
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One implication of these restrictions is that net expenditure per EGM varies widely across Victoria, with total net
expenditure per EGM in 2011-12 as high as $150,000+ per year in the City of Whittlesea and as low as $35,000
per year in the Shire of Gannawarra. Apart from the spread in the net expenditure per EGM, the LGAs also differ
in other aspects such as the exposure to tourism flows or seasonality (e.g. the Surf Coast and Alpine region) and
other, unobservable, differences. We address these issues in the model specification outlined below.
III. Estimation strategy
Our basic model specification is a linear regression of real monthly net expenditure per EGM on a constant, a
linear time trend (in calendar years) and 11 calendar month dummies, with January taken as the reference
month (i.e. µ1 = 0). Subscript i represents the LGA (of which we have 62) and subscript t represents the period
(of which we have 96). The basic model is a single OLS regression on the pooled data:
Yit = α +γ ∗Y eart +µ2 ∗Febt +µ3 ∗Mart + · · ·+µ12 ∗Dect (1)
We expect diversity in unmeasured LGA specific characteristics across LGAs to explain most variation in the
dependent variable. It is inappropriate to assume, for example, that unmeasured factors affecting gaming
behaviour in the Surf Coast (a tourist economy) are the same as those in Melbourne. To address this, we estimate
a single fixed effects regression that allows for a unique intercept term for each LGA:
Yit = αi +γ ∗Y eart +µ2 ∗Febt +µ3 ∗Mart + ..+µ12 ∗Dect (2)
Allowing the intercept to vary by LGA greatly improves the model fit. In the standard OLS regression (Equation
(1)) the R-squared is .03 but in the fixed effects regression (estimated using the absorbing technique) the R-square
is .92. However, simply looking at the raw data makes it apparent that assuming a single common time trend
and a single common monthly seasonality pattern for all LGAs is inappropriate. For instance, EGM operators in
the Shire of Surf Coast make the bulk of their money during two months in summer, a time when Victorians
on average spend less on EGMs. For illustration, Figures 4 and 5 in the Appendix compare additive time series
decompositions of net monthly expenditure per EGM for the Surf Coast with Victoria as a whole. Given these
differences a more desirable specification is to estimate Equation (1) for each of the 62 LGAs separately, from the
Borough of Queenscliffe to the Shire of Yarra Ranges.
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For i = 1,2,3, . . . ,62:
Yit = αi +γi ∗Y eart +µi_2 ∗Febt +µi_3 ∗Mart + ..+µi_12 ∗Dect (3)
Equations (2) and (3) serve as the baseline models. We then re-estimate them 96 times and each time include an
indicator for a specific month in a specific year. That is, a different dummy variable is used to identify each of
the 96 periods in turn. The coefficient on this variable is interpreted as the estimated monthly anomaly (EMA).
Equation (2) becomes:
Yit = αi +γ ∗Y eart +µ2 ∗Febt +µ3 ∗Mart + ..+µ12 ∗Dect +
96∑
t=1
EMAk ∗ I(t=k) (4)
where I() is an indicator function. After estimating Equation (4) 96 times (for k = 1,2,3, . . . ,96) we get 96
estimates of EMAk , one for each month. From Equation (3) we have:
For i = 1,2,3, . . . ,62:
Yit = αi +γi ∗Y eart +µi_2 ∗Febt +µi_3 ∗Mart + ..+µi_12 ∗Dect +
96∑
t=1
EMAi_k ∗ I(t=k) (5)
We estimate the set of 62 equations 96 times (for k = 1,2,3, . . . ,96) such that for each month k in (5) we have 62
estimates EMAi_k .
IV. Results
Figure 2 plots the 96 EMAk estimated by Equation (4). Increases in EGM net expenditures are most pronounced
in months when stimulus cheques were distributed. The December 2008 anomaly of more than $840 per EGM is
by far the largest. The EMAs in May and June 2012, when households received compensation for the impending
Carbon Tax, are negligible by comparison.
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FIGURE 2: Estimated monthly anomalies from July 2004 to June 2012
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Notes: Coefficients from 96 linear regression models each with a dummy variable for a specific period (the EMAk from
Equation (4)). Triangles identify periods when stimulus packages were received. Squares identify periods when Carbon
Tax compensation was received. Purple identifies Marchs from 2004-2012. Blue identifies Aprils from 2004-2012.
Orange identifies Mays from 2004-2012. Red identifies Decembers from 2004-2011. Table 4 in the appendix lists the
96 estimated EMAk and provides (panel corrected) standard errors.
Equation (5) produced 62 estimates for each of the 96 periods (the EMAi_k). This created 5,952 estimated
monthly anomalies in total or 62 for each time period. Figure 3 plots kernel densities of EMAi_k for months
when households received windfall income along with August 2004, the only period in the series that stands out.11
The densities for December 2008 and April-May 2009 are distinctly different from their respective counterparts
in other years. In contrast, the densities for May and June 2012 are not at all unusual. Figure (6) in the Appendix
displays results for the remaining months. These show overlapping densities and no anomalies. One exception
is January 2009, which suggests some of the December 2008 stimulus was spent in the following month. It is
only though Figures 3 and 6 that one can truly see the economic significance of the cheques and get a sense of
how much a specific period stands out. The estimates for each monthly anomaly EMAk from the fixed effects
11It is beyond the scope of the current paper to further investigate August 2004, but a possible answer could lie in August being a month
when tax refunds and end-of-year Family Tax Benefits are paid upon reconciliation of tax returns and payments made by the Family Assistance
Office.
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FIGURE 3: Kernel densities of monthly anomalies over LGAs for selected months
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Notes: Kernel densities of the coefficients from 96 sets of 62 linear regression models (the EMAi_k from Equation (5))
for selected calendar months. Kernel densities use Epanechnikov kernels. Dotted lines represent periods with windfall
income.
specification in Equation (4 are reported with (panel corrected) standard errors in Table 4 in the Appendix.
10
V. Concluding remarks
The Carbon Tax cheques distributed in May and June 2012 cannot be directly compared to the stimulus cheques
paid in December 2008 (ESS) and March-May 2009 (NBP). The Carbon Tax cheques were much smaller (hun-
dreds rather than thousands of dollars) and paid when households were expecting an increase in their gas and
energy bills on 1 July 2012. Moreover, the Carbon Tax payments were framed as a rebate on rising costs of living
due to a forthcoming tax. The stimulus cheques were framed as a bonus with a message to spend those cheques
to stave off recession. Individuals are more likely to spend and spending rates are much higher when windfall
income is framed as a bonus rather than a rebate (Epley et al., 2006; Epley and Gneezy, 2007).
The ESS delivered $8.8 billion in cheques to Australian households in December 2008. According to recent
estimates, Australia’s population was 21,644,000 with 5,364,800 (or 25%) living in Victoria in December 2008
(Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2012). This suggests Victoria’s share of the stimulus was about $2.2 billion.
Given the estimated anomaly for December 2008 of $841.40 per EGM and 26,797 EGMs in Victoria in December
2008 this implies 1% of the total stimulus allocated to Victoria was spent on EGMs (or about $22.5 million). If
only a subset of Victorians frequent EGMs this estimate is misleading.
A recent study that profiled gaming participation and preferences in Victoria over the period August to October
2008 (Victorian DOJ, 2009) estimated 21.46% of Victorian adults used EGMs during the previous 12-month
period. Allocating the $2.2 billion over 4.1 million adults implies an average stimulus of $536 per adult. This
assumes the increase in EGM expenditure of $22.5 million was due to 861,000 (21.46%) of Victoria’s 4.1 million
adults (Pearson, 2010, p.4), or about $26 per adult. The ratio of $26 to $536 is 4.85%. This estimate suggests
those who use EGMs spent, on average, about 5% of their stimulus cheques at EGMs. This estimate relies on
averages and variation across individual gamblers may be substantial. Problem gamblers, for example, may have
spent considerably more than 5% of their stimulus cheques at poker machines.
This paper has demonstrated how windfall income increases expenditure at poker machines. The estimates
presented here rely on expenditure for Victoria as a whole. A crucial path for future research is examining the
variation in expenditure across different sub-populations in response to policy changes. We are unable to consider
the variation in stimulus money allocated across LGAs with publicly available data. If existing government data
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were freely available far better estimates of the share of stimulus money spent at EGMs could be computed. For
instance, data from Centrelink and the Australian Taxation Office would reveal the exact amount of stimulus
received by LGA under both the ESS and NBP. This would provide a means to estimate how much of the stimulus
was spent at EGMs at the local level.
EGM regulation in Australia is a widespread political and economic concern with considerable normative implica-
tions. A mandatory pre-commitment trial is scheduled to start this year in the Australian Capital Territory and
additional reform is a likely bargaining point for future political negotiations (The Economist, 2012b). In July
2012 a ban on ATMs in gaming venues also came into effect in Victoria. Further quantitative research will help
determine the impact of these policy changes and provide guidance for reform based on efficacy rather than
advocacy.
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Appendix
TABLE 3: Total gambling expenditure (million AUD): 2008-2009
ACT NSW NT QLD SA TAS VIC WA Total
Off-course bookmaker - - - - 0.025 - 16.251 - 16.276
On-course bookmaker 0.565 30.977 191.805 - 1.791 0.253 16.322 4.616 246.329
On-course totalisator 0.541 50.569 2.448 - - 1.595 57.283 14.634 127.070
TAB 26.858 748.648 23.801 355.849 113.820 93.029 597.036 257.622 2216.663
Total Racing 27.964 830.194 218.055 355.849 115.636 94.877 686.892 276.872 2606.399
Casino 18.836 747.799 114.730 579.785 134.509 113.914 1218.258 535.121 3462.952
Gaming machines 175.114 4772.059 78.665 1860.606 750.653 123.977 2707.278 - 10468.352
Instant lottery 1.904 66.232 1.384 93.659 12.440 3.594 17.414 38.903 235.531
Interactive gaming - - 0.761 - - - - - 0.761
Keno 0.943 105.416 8.180 96.438 16.702 25.792 6.587 - 260.058
Lotteries 0.925 44.150 - 0.557 - 0.448 1.411 - 47.491
Lotto 17.737 505.339 16.185 342.388 98.001 26.804 419.573 278.880 1704.907
Minor gaming - - - - - - - 23.224 23.224
Pools 0.098 3.766 0.023 1.832 0.321 0.114 1.229 0.679 8.062
Total Gaming 215.557 6244.761 219.929 2975.265 1012.626 294.643 4371.750 876.807 16211.339
Bookmaker (and other)
Fixed Odds - 6.040 62.445 - 0.418 - 5.215 0.443 74.561
Pool Betting - - - - - - - - -
TAB Fixed Odds - 65.252 - 12.359 5.072 6.360 40.274 9.459 138.776
TAB Tote Odds - 4.128 - 0.864 - 0.022 2.559 0.577 8.150
Total sports betting 0.000 75.420 62.445 13.223 5.490 6.382 48.048 10.479 221.487
Total all gambling 243.521 7150.375 500.429 3344.337 1133.752 395.902 5106.690 1164.159 19039.165
Notes: Total gambling expenditure 2008-09 reproduced from the Queensland Government’s Office of Economic and Statistical Research oesr.qld.gov.au
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FIGURE 4: Time series decomposition of real monthly net expenditure per EGM over July 2004 to June 2012 - Surf Coast
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FIGURE 5: Time series decomposition of real monthly net expenditure per EGM over July 2004 to June 2012 - Victoria
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Notes: Decomposition of the observed time series into a seasonal component, a trend component and a remaining
(random) component. The original series of real monthly net expenditure per EGM has been divided by 100 to prevent
the legend text of the Y-axes from overlapping. The small circles represent the months. The first observation is July
2004.
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FIGURE 6: Kernel densities of monthly anomalies over LGAs for remaining months
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Notes: Kernel densities of the coefficients from 96 sets of 62 linear regression models (the EMAi_k from Equation (5))
for the remaining calendar months not displayed in Figure (3). Kernel densities use Epanechnikov kernels.
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TABLE 4: Estimates of monthly anomalies July 2004 to June 2012 - fixed effects (Equation (4))
Period EMAk SE Period EMAk SE Period EMAk SE
Jul ‘04 -83.61 193.89 Mar ‘07 320.67 189.04 Nov ‘09 -206.66 190.69
Aug ‘04 -432.61*** 188.99 Apr ‘07 162.19 191.14 Dec ‘09 -253.61 190.10
Sep ‘04 -51.45 194.01 May ‘07 178.88 190.98 Jan ‘10 -104.65 191.56
Oct ‘04 -103.50 193.79 Jun ‘07 331.78* 188.84 Feb ‘10 -226.11 190.46
Nov ‘04 -210.50 192.88 Jul ‘07 -50.05 191.35 Mar ‘10 -325.65* 188.95
Dec ‘04 -186.73 193.14 Aug ‘07 305.09 188.87 Apr ‘10 -99.74 191.58
Jan ‘05 -171.30 193.29 Sep ‘07 131.50 190.95 May ‘10 -245.27 190.21
Feb ‘05 -126.45 193.65 Oct ‘07 175.15 190.58 Jun ‘10 -344.77* 188.60
Mar ‘05 -107.91 193.76 Nov ‘07 310.17* 188.78 Jul ‘10 95.57 192.49
Apr ‘05 -97.39 193.82 Dec ‘07 -119.34 191.0 Aug ‘10 -45.79 192.68
May ‘05 -139.48 193.55 Jan ‘08 -9.31 191.41 Sep ‘10 54.04 192.65
Jun ‘05 25.01 194.06 Feb ‘08 278.36 189.30 Oct ‘10 -1.19 192.73
Jul ‘05 -85.87 192.53 Mar ‘08 -258.68 189.5 Nov ‘10 -17.74 192.73
Aug ‘05 -31.72 192.71 Apr ‘08 -122.33 191.0 Dec ‘10 -109.65 192.41
Sep ‘05 88.52 192.52 May ‘08 92.47 191.18 Jan ‘11 20.35 192.72
Oct ‘05 -70.23 192.60 Jun ‘08 100.49 191.14 Feb ‘11 17.84 192.73
Nov ‘05 -161.22 192.03 Jul ‘08 182.05 190.51 Mar ‘11 -43.03 192.68
Dec ‘05 58.07 192.64 Aug ‘08 224.04 190.05 Apr ‘11 -127.30 192.30
Jan ‘06 -59.24 192.64 Sep ‘08 -103.22 191.1 May ‘11 -261.91 190.87
Feb ‘06 -47.25 192.67 Oct ‘08 218.86 190.11 Jun ‘11 -210.10 191.54
Mar ‘06 -17.67 192.73 Nov ‘08 264.10 189.51 Jul ‘11 -51.21 194.01
Apr ‘06 100.19 192.46 Dec ‘08 842.23*** 171.03 Aug ‘11 -106.62 193.77
May ‘06 -48.17 192.67 Jan ‘09 379.66** 187.45 Sep ‘11 21.67 194.06
Jun ‘06 -19.16 192.72 Feb ‘09 25.58 191.40 Oct ‘11 -153.06 193.45
Jul ‘06 -299.27 189.41 Mar ‘09 338.33* 188.28 Nov ‘11 -136.48 193.58
Aug ‘06 -71.80 191.71 Apr ‘09 454.96*** 185.70 Dec ‘11 -193.10 193.07
Sep ‘06 -81.02 191.67 May ‘09 596.61*** 181.47 Jan ‘12 -141.82 193.54
Oct ‘06 -209.87 190.65 Jun ‘09 121.05 191.02 Feb ‘12 86.68 193.88
Nov ‘06 146.18 191.27 Jul ‘09 288.80 189.58 Mar ‘12 92.67 193.85
Dec ‘06 -50.29 191.78 Aug ‘09 144.01 191.29 Apr ‘12 -280.97 191.95
Jan ‘07 77.14 191.69 Sep ‘09 -59.55 191.76 May ‘12 -186.53 193.14
Feb ‘07 -11.21 191.85 Oct ‘09 135.56 191.35 Jun ‘12 -6.99 194.08
Notes: These are the same EMAk displayed graphically in Figure (2), but included here are the panel corrected standard errors (Beck
and Katz, 1995; Bailey and Katz, 2011).
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